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Abstract 
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated 
individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social norms that 
discriminate the good (those who deserve to be rewarded with help) and the bad (those who 
should be punished by refusal of help). Despite intensive research, however, there is no 
definitive consensus on what social norms best promote cooperation through indirect reciprocity, 
and it remains unclear even how those who refuse to help the bad should be assessed. Here, we 
propose a new simple norm called “Staying” that prescribes abstaining from assessment. Under 
the Staying norm, the image of the person who makes the decision to give help stays the same as 
in the last assessment if the person on the receiving end has a bad image. In this case, the choice 
about whether or not to give help to the potential receiver does not affect the image of the 
potential giver. We analyze the Staying norm in terms of evolutionary game theory and 
demonstrate that Staying is most effective in establishing cooperation compared to the prevailing 
social norms, which rely on constant monitoring and unconditional assessment. The application 
of Staying suggests that the strict application of moral judgment is limited. 
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Introduction 
How to get unrelated people to mutually cooperate is a fundamental issue in today’s highly 
mobile society. The last decades have seen researchers exploring indirect reciprocity, which is a 
major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation between non-relatives1-10. The emergence of 
cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be summarized as, “I will help you if you have helped 
someone”10. Because helping is costly, however, self-interested recipients of help tend to 
freeload off others without further reciprocation, and unconditional cooperation is unlikely to 
evolve unless a specific supportive mechanism is provided11. Conditional cooperation, a main 
paradigm for exploring cooperation12, suggests that cooperation should be channeled to those 
who deserve help by using social network assessment systems, such as reputation or gossip 
media13-18. 
How should one assess others’ past behaviors? The simplest social norm, called Scoring, 
assesses those who give and refuse to give help as good and bad, respectively19,20. This norm 
depends only on individuals’ previous actions. Since the seminal study of Nowak and 
Sigmund10, Scoring has been investigated in terms of evolutionary game theory, primarily using 
a donor–recipient giving game. 
Unconditionally applying the Scoring norm raises a key question: Is it morally or socially 
acceptable to refuse to help someone with a bad image? This point is Scoring’s Achilles’ heel in 
the typical good-or-bad binary system10. By definition, when a discriminator refuses to help a 
potential opponent with a bad image, the discriminator’s image decisions become clouded. Thus, 
in the Scoring norm, a bad image is contagious. Although helping can redress the discriminator’s 
image, a bad image may cause the discriminator to undergo rejection by other discriminators. 
Even slight involuntary errors can damage a discriminator’s image and thus payoff. The Scoring 
norm, therefore, results in the mutual defection of all players21,22; this is referred as the “Scoring 
dilemma.” 
To address this dilemma, social norms have been developed that distinguish between 
justified and unjustified defection by accounting for the recipient’s image1. In the case of a bad 
recipient being refused help, such refusal should not damage the donor’s image (i.e., justified 
defection)1,21,22. Indeed, the top eight social norms, identified from 4,096 candidate strategies by 
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systematic research (called the “leading eight”)23,24 share a common relevant feature—if a good 
donor refuses to help a bad recipient, the donor is assigned a good image (see Table S1). 
Although the leading social norms are highly sophisticated, they are thus cognitively 
costly. Indeed, all of the leading eight rely on (i) the donor’s last action and (ii) the recipient’s 
last image (i.e., second-order social norms), and six of them also rely on (iii) the donor’s last 
image (i.e., third-order social norms)25. Accounting for the image of both players would be 
rational in theory yet may overtax individuals in practice. Empirical studies on indirect 
reciprocity games have reported experimental results that many participants’ assessments have 
appeared to rely only on the player’s actions, not also on the images a player views26. We posit 
that there is a simpler method than that provided by the leading eight. 
To tackle the Scoring dilemma, we formulate an opposite approach from prior paradigms 
by not applying higher-order social norms. We consider the effects of ignoring anxiety-
producing stimuli from controversial interactions (“selective inattention”27). Assessing a donor 
who interacts with a recipient who has a bad image is a difficult task and is likely to lead an 
observer to feel regret about his or her assessment, regardless of whether the assessment is 
determined to be good or bad. This stressful situation may lead an observer to intuitively prefer 
inattention to interaction, that is, to abstain from making assessments. There is much supportive 
evidence of inattentive behavior by experiments28,29 and field research30-32. Recent experimental 
data also suggest that a substantial fraction of subjects selectively consider the information of 
donor and recipient (that is, first- and second-order information) when making moralistic 
decisions33. Thus, we assume conditional observation on the opponent’s image34,35 (Fig. 1). The 
assessment system abstains from observation and thus also from assessment of whether or not 
refusal of help to the bad recipient is justified. Conditional assessment can prevent damage to the 
donor’s image as it substantially generalizes the standard framework of indirect reciprocity to a 
meta-choice of {Assess, Preserve}. In the Assess case, the assessment is made according to the 
specific social norm, whereas in the Preserve case, the pre-existing image of the focal player is 
kept as is. The Preserve option is applicable for a broad range of assessment systems. We apply a 
conditional assessment for Scoring, leading to a new social norm—to perform an assessment as 
Scoring when a potential recipient has a good image; otherwise, to abstain from assessment. We 
call this new norm Staying. 
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Results 
We model our paradigm on the giving game in which the donor player has an opportunity to help 
the recipient player at a personal cost  c > 0 ; if the donor helps, then the recipient earns benefit 
 b> 0 , with  b> c . For simplicity, we assume that all discriminators share the same information 
about all personal images provided by this unique assessment system. We then consider both (i) 
implementation error21,36, by which intentional help involuntarily fails with probability  e1 , and 
(ii) assessment error25, by which the assessment system mistakenly assesses a good donor as bad 
or a bad donor as good, with probability  e2 . 
We compare Staying with the four most prevailing social norms10,37,38: Scoring19,20,39-41, 
Simple-standing1,21,22, Stern-judging3,37, and Shunning5,42 (Table 1). Simple-standing and Stern-
judging are the only two second-order social norms among the leading eight. When a donor 
refuses to help a bad recipient, Simple-standing and Stern-judging assess the donor as good, 
whereas Scoring and Shunning evaluate the donor as bad. Simple-standing, the most tolerant 
norm, assigns a good image to a person helping an individual evaluated as bad, and under 
Shunning, the most strict norm, a bad image is assigned to a donor who does not help a potential 
recipient evaluated as bad. In contrast with the four most prevailing social norms, no assessment 
is performed under Staying; the player’s pre-existing image is simply preserved. 
To study the evolutionary effects of these different social norms, we assume distinct 
strategies in very large populations: cooperators, defectors, and discriminators. Cooperators 
unconditionally give help; defectors unconditionally refuse to help; and discriminators, 
irrespective of the social norm, give and refuse help to good and bad recipients, respectively. In 
this study, we investigate the replicator dynamics describing the tendency whereby strategies that 
result in above-average earnings grow in frequency39,43. We note that the three homogeneous 
population states of cooperators, defectors, and discriminators are trivial equilibria of the 
replicator dynamics. We further assume that image updating is much faster than the time scale of 
game interactions so that we can study the replicator dynamics at a stationary state of the image 
system43. More detail is provided in Methods. 
We first describe the Staying paradigm (Fig. 2a). Staying results in a defector–
discriminator mixed equilibrium R with the fraction of discriminators  
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zR =
e2c
λ(b−c)
,          (1) 
where  λ= (1−e1)(1−2e2 )  describes social visibility, the probability that a donor’s intention to 
cooperate is clearly recognized by an observer. There is no interior equilibrium that consists of 
all three strategies. Equilibrium R consists exclusively of defectors and discriminators and is a 
unique non-trivial equilibrium. Equilibrium R is unstable, and its  zR  value indicates the minimal 
frequency of discriminators required to invade then take over a population of defectors. For a 
sufficiently small assessment error  e2 , equilibrium R appears in the state space, and depending 
on the initial conditions, the ending population consists exclusively of either defectors or 
discriminators. As the assessment error  e2  gets close to 0, equilibrium R approaches the state of 
100% defectors, and the range of initial conditions leading the population to evolve to the state 
of 100% discriminators expands (see Methods for detailed analysis). 
The other four rules examined are Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and 
Shunning (Fig. 2b-e). In these cases, for a sufficiently small cost–benefit ratio c/b, the 
evolutionary dynamics result in an unstable mixed equilibrium R of defectors and discriminators, 
with the fraction of discriminators  
 
zR =
c
λb
≥
c
b
.            (2) 
This value is common across Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and Shunning, yet 
generically different from that of Staying in equation (1). The evolutionary dynamics with 
Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and Shunning are all bi-stable, similarly to that with 
Staying (see Supplementary Information, Text S1 for detailed analysis). In Simple-standing, 
Stern-judging, and Shunning, similarly, there is no interior equilibrium, and R is a unique non-
trivial equilibrium. In contrast to this, in Scoring there can be a continuum of equilibria in the 
interior state space, and R is an end of the continuum (Fig. 2b).  
It follows from equations (1) and (2) that for  e2 <1−c b , the range of initial conditions 
leading to selecting for discriminators between the two strategies is wider for Staying than for 
the other four norms. Note that in any case of Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and 
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Shunning, a fraction of discriminators less than c/b is incapable of invading successfully. In 
striking contrast to this, for a sufficiently small assessment error  e2 , Staying can thrive even if 
the initial fraction of discriminators is very low taking over the population of defectors, 
irrespective of the cost–benefit ratio. 
Discussion 
Most theory on the evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity is based on unconditional 
assessment. Evolutionary study on conditional assessment has started mainly by individual-based 
simulations, in which the corresponding assessment rule was named “us-TFT”34,35. In this paper, 
we fully analyze Staying, which is characterized by conditional assessment, and reveal that 
discriminators with Staying are more likely to invade the population of defectors than those with 
the four most prevailing social norms of indirect reciprocity10,37,38: Scoring19,20,39-41, Simple-
standing1,21,22, Stern-judging3,37, and Shunning5,42 (Table 1). In mutual defection, within the 
population of defectors, either Simple-standing or Stern-judging leads defectors evaluated as bad 
to look good and then to exploit help from other discriminators. In contrast, under the Scoring or 
Shunning norm, discriminators are evaluated as bad as a result of interacting with defectors, 
leading to rejection by other discriminators; this is the main reason why the four social norms 
Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and Shunning are unlikely to emerge. In contrast, 
Staying can leave the images of good discriminators and bad defectors intact; this enables 
discriminators to channel their cooperation and subvert the stalemate of mutual defection even 
with a small perturbation of the population state (which is on the order of assessment errors; see 
equation (2)). 
The advantages of Staying are not limited to the emergence of effectiveness. A third-
order social norm in the leading eight, called Strict-standing23 (or L7 43), can provide the same 
image dynamics as Staying (see Table S1). This fact indicates that Strict-standing is as 
evolutionarily stable as Staying; however, Strict-standing and Staying are conceptually different. 
Staying preserves the donor’s image as a result of abstention from observation; in contrast, 
Strict-standing reassigns the previous image during execution of the observation. The leading 
eight, which share the obligatory nature of unconditional observation, are less advantageous than 
Staying in terms of the load and error of cognitive process and information transfer. As such, 
 7 
conditional assessment, a property that characterizes Staying, can facilitate savings on the cost 
associated with running moral assessment systems. This would help mitigate the problem of 
second-order free riders who fail to contribute to costly assessments and only rely on assessment 
information provided or financed by others44,45. 
Our model can serve as a point of departure for investigating the effects of conditional 
assessment in various situations relevant to the evolution and development of human 
cooperation. Our model resembles a simplified top-down situation in which a unique media 
source delivers a story to infinitely large followers, who share the same assessment. The top-
down situation considered has been extended in investigating situations in which assessment 
criteria and perception process vary by different individuals46,47, populations are finite and 
structured48-51, and individuals often interact by both direct and indirect reciprocity52,53, as in 
small villages with gossip systems. Also, advances in information technology (IT) would 
promote the broad use of assessment systems with multivalued scores19,54 or continuously 
varying scores55, which otherwise usually require more cognitive load than do the binary 
assessment models considered. Thus, the results of future work that examines conditional 
assessment in indirect reciprocity by local gossip networks or sophisticated IT-aided rating, as 
such, will be fascinating.  
Refusing to help the bad is difficult to morally assess. The situation causes a variety of 
controversial opinions and, viewed as a kind of punishment, is related to the argument about the 
need to consider the reputation of the punisher56-63. Previous study of indirect reciprocity 
answered strictly to this situation with a clear standard of justice; in contrast, Staying suspends 
the application of a scoring rule to this situation. Staying can be seen as a social norm applied 
loosely to some extent. As is known, the application of the law is difficult, and judicial discretion 
sometimes has to work. The controversy has been continuing between two principles. One 
recognizes that a law is sometimes forced to be applied loosely and tolerates judgment based on 
the judge’s belief64. The other inhibits the judicial discretion and requires a judge to apply a law 
strictly65. We unveiled the excellence of Staying in forming social order. The findings suggest a 
limitation of the strict application of rules. In this sense, our study implies that the evolutionary 
study of indirect reciprocity can contribute to a further understanding of social norms and the 
law. 
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Methods 
Indirect reciprocity in the giving game. The main model is based on the standard framework 
for the evolution of indirect reciprocity23-25. Using this framework, discriminators are given a 
strategy by an assessment rule (called social norm) combined with an action rule. We base 
indirect reciprocity on the giving game, which is a two-player donation game in which one 
player acts as a donor and the other a recipient. The donor is given the opportunity to choose to 
help the recipient at a personal cost. The recipient can only receive help from the donor, if any is 
forthcoming. In other words, there is no option to reject help.  
In this giving game, action rules prescribe to discriminators who are acting as potential 
donors how to respond to a potential recipient in a specific situation depending on the last image 
scores of both donor and recipient. We consider a simple model in which each individual is 
endowed with a binary image score of “good” or “bad.” The action rule we apply to 
discriminators is to give help to a good recipient or to refuse to help a bad one, unless otherwise 
specified. After observing every interaction in the giving game, discriminators assign the donor’s 
image by following the specific social norm, which is a function of (i) the donor’s last action, (ii) 
the recipient’s last image, and (iii) the donor’s last image. When depending only on (i), the rule 
is called first order, when depending on both (i) and (ii), it is called second order, and when 
depending on (i), (ii), and (iii), it is called third order23.  
Conditional assessment. In the present study, we examine conditional assessment34,35, which 
specifies a meta-choice of “Assess” or “Preserve.” When choosing Assess, discriminators assign 
either a good or a bad image to a potential donor; when choosing Preserve, discriminators abstain 
from assessment. Based on this concept of conditional assessment, we introduce “Staying,” 
which is a new social norm specifying that when a potential recipient is good, the donor’s image 
should be assessed, as is done under Scoring, and when a potential recipient is bad, the donor’s 
image should be preserved (that is, left unchanged). 
To understand Staying, we also comparatively explore all first- and second-order social 
norms that take into account the recipient’s last image and the donor’s last action10,37,38. In 
particular, we focus on the four most prevailing social norms: Scoring19,20,39-41, Simple-
standing1,21,22, Stern-judging3,37, and Shunning5,42. Scoring is the best-known first-order social 
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norm, and the other three are second-order social norms. Table 1 and Table S1 provide full 
details of these social norms. When assessing the use of Staying and the four norms, the 
consensus is that if a recipient has a good image, a good image should be assigned to those who 
helped and a bad image to those who did not help, the same as in the simplest case, Scoring. 
Observation, information, and errors. In the model, we consider both public information and 
indirect observation. We assume indirect observation as players with the same social norm 
adopting and equally sharing the same image of a focal player, which has been provided by a 
representative observer. For simplicity, we also assume perfect information in which the 
probability that players know the image of a potential recipient is 100%. In addition, we consider 
both implementation error21,36,38 and assessment error25. We denote by  e1  the probability that a 
player who intends to give help but fails to do so. On the other hand, for a player who intends to 
refuse to help, no implementation error occurs in the intentional refusal, and the player inevitably 
does so. The unilaterality of the implementation error, as such, can occur, in particular, when 
there is a lack of resources for helping, in which case it matters for an individual who intends to 
help (leading to the “phenotypic defector”36), yet does not for an individual who intends to refuse 
to help. We denote by  e2  the probability that an observer mistakenly assigns a bad image to a 
donor who should get a good one or assigns a good image to a donor who should get a bad one. 
The assessment error  e2  can be considered small enough ( <1 2 ). The combination of the 
implementation and assessment errors is often considered in the theoretical study of the leading 
social norms for the evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity23-25. 
Evolutionary dynamics. To study the evolutionary dynamics of discriminators, we employ a 
continuous-entry model. An individual’s social learning (or birth and death) sometimes happens, 
and when it does, this changes the strategy distribution in the population39,58. For analytic 
simplicity, we consider that in an individual’s lifetime, that individual infinitely plays the one-
round giving game with different opponents. We also consider an infinitely large population to 
examine replicator dynamics43, which, in general, are described as  dxS dt = xS (PS −P) , where 
 xS  denotes the relative frequency of strategy S;  PS  is the expected payoff for strategy S, given by 
the limit in the mean of the payoff per round for the strategy; and P is the average payoff over 
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the population, given by  xS PS∑ . We note that each homogeneous state with  xS =1  is a trivial 
equilibrium of the replicator dynamics. First, we examine three strategies: discriminators [S = Z], 
cooperators [X], and defectors [Y]. Cooperators unconditionally intend to help a potential 
recipient, and in contrast, defectors unconditionally intend not to help a potential recipient. 
Image dynamics. To describe the dynamics of image scores, both good and bad, we use  gS  to 
denote the frequency of individuals with a good image among individuals adopting the same 
strategy S, and we use g to denote the average fraction of individuals with good images over the 
population; thus,  g = xgX + ygY + zgZ . In addition, we use  
gS ,I  to denote the probability that a 
good image is assigned to a potential donor who adopts strategy S and also faces a potential 
recipient with an image score I = good [G] or bad [B]. The population size is very large, so we 
assume that the composition of the population does not change between consecutive one-round 
giving games39,43. Thus, the frequencies of good players satisfy 
 
gX = gX ,G g + gX ,B(1−g),
gY = gY ,G g + gY ,B(1−g),
gZ = gZ ,G g + gZ ,B(1−g).
          (3) 
Staying norm. We begin by analyzing the Staying norm, in which case equation (3) is described 
as 
 
gX = εg + gX (1−g),
gY = e2g + gY (1−g),
gZ = εg + gZ (1−g),
          (4)
 
where  ε= (1−e1)(1−e2 )+ e1e2 . In equation (4), the first term  εg  in the sum for  gX  or  gZ  
describes the probability that a cooperator or discriminator who faces a good recipient 
(probability g) is assigned a good image by giving help with no errors (probability 
 (1−e1)(1−e2 ) ) or by failing to give help with both errors (probability  e1e2 ). For  gY , the term 
 e2g  in the sum expresses the probability that a defector who faces a good recipient (probability 
g) is assigned a good image through assessment errors (probability  e2 ). The second term in the 
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sum,  gS (1−g) , describes the probability that a donor who faces a bad recipient (probability 
 1−g ) is assigned a good image. In this case, according to the definition of Staying, the 
probability of finding a good discriminator should remain unchanged as  gS . Solving these 
equations leads to  gY = e2 ,  gX = gZ = ε , and thus  g = e2 y +ε(1− y) .  
Then, the expected payoffs are given by 
 
PX = (1−e1)b(x + gX z)−(1−e1)c,
PY = (1−e1)b(x + gY z),
PZ = (1−e1)b(x + gZ z)−(1−e1)cg.
         (5) 
This yields 
 PZ −PY = (1−e1)[b(gZ −gY )z−cg].        (6) 
For  x = 0 , that is, on edge YZ in Fig. 2a, we have  
 PZ −PY = (1−e1)[(ε−e2 )(b−c)z−e2c].         (7) 
This results in  z = zR  such that it satisfies  PZ −PY = 0 , leading to  
 
zR =
e2c
(ε−e2 )(b−c)
=
e2c
(1−e1)(1−2e2 )(b−c)
.        (8) 
Considering that  0 < e2 <1 2  and  b> c , a boundary equilibrium R with 
 (x, y, z) = (0,1− zR , zR )  enters the edge YZ for the typical parameter settings ( b> c , and  e1  and 
 e2  are sufficiently small). Along the edge, the replicator dynamics are described as 
 dz dt = z(1− z)(PZ −PY ) , and this yields  dz dt < 0  for  z < zR  or  dz dt > 0  for  z > zR . 
Equilibrium R is repelling along the edge and divides the edge into the basins of attraction for 
the homogeneous states of defectors ( y =1) and discriminators ( z =1). 
Next, we turn to the payoff difference between cooperators and discriminators 
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 PZ −PX = (1−e1)[b(gZ −gX )z−c(g−1)].        (9) 
Considering  gX = gZ = ε , it follows that  
 PZ −PX = (1−e1)c(g−1)≥0,         (10) 
where the average frequency of good g is less than 1 when both errors are non-zero. This means 
that for the typical parameter settings, cooperators are dominated by discriminators and 
defectors, thus leading the population to converge to edge YZ ( x = 0 ). It follows that the 
homogeneous state of discriminators ( z =1) is evolutionarily stable for sufficiently small errors 
(see Fig. 2a) and becomes globally stable when there is no assessment error,  e2 = 0 .  
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Tables 
Table 1. How social norms make moral assessments in giving games. 
C
on
di
tio
ns
 Recipient’s 
image 
G G B B 
Donor’s 
action 
C D C D 
A
ss
es
sm
en
t: 
W
ha
t d
oe
s 
th
e 
do
no
r i
m
ag
e 
lo
ok
 li
ke
? 
Staying G B P P 
Scoring G B G B 
Simple-standing G B G G 
Stern-judging G B B G 
Shunning G B B B 
“G” and “B” describe a good and bad image, respectively. “C” and “D” denote an action to help 
and to refuse to help, respectively. “P” means the image of a donor remains unchanged 
(“Preserve”).
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Conditional assessment in giving games. In the Staying rule, (a) the observer 
assesses the donor’s image score, if the recipient has a good image; (b) otherwise, the observer 
does not assess the donor’s image score, which stays the same.
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Table 2 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of indirect reciprocity with different social norms. The triangles describe 
a simplex of the state space  {(x, y, z) : x + y + z =1} , where  x, y, z≥0  denote the frequencies of 
cooperators, defectors, and discriminators, respectively. Each node (X, Y, or Z: x, y, or  z =1) of 
the triangle corresponds to the homogeneous state of each specific strategy. (a) Under Staying, 
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discriminators always are better off than cooperators. Thus, cooperators will vanish and the 
population will eventually converge to either node Z or Y. (b) Under Scoring, a continuum of 
equilibria connects boundary attractor Q and repeller R. The population drifts along the 
continuum and moves close to R, eventually attaining node Y. (c-e) Under Simple-standing, 
Stern-judging, or Shunning, the dynamics are qualitatively similar to those in (a). The basin of 
attraction for node Z is wider in (a) than in (b-e). Parameters:  c =1 ,  b =1.5 ,  e1 = e2 = 0.01 . R 
corresponds approximately to  zR = 0.02  in (a) or  zR = 0.66  in (b-e). 
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The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity 
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Yutaka Nakai 
This PDF file includes Text S1 and Table S1. 
Text S1: Evolutionary dynamics for second-order social norms  
We then focus on the 16 second-order social norms (except for one that prescribes unconditional 
defection given by BBBB (to unconditionally assign bad using Table 1). Compared to the case of 
the Staying norm, any of these 16 norms is less likely to invade a population of defectors. We 
note that since discriminators and defectors intend to refuse to help a bad recipient,  
gY ,B = gZ ,B  
holds. To analyze the replicator equations, we apply the expected payoffs, as in equation (5). For 
any of the 16 norms, equation (6) becomes  
 
PZ −PY = (1−e1)[b(gZ ,G −gY ,G )z−c]g.       (S1) 
We consider small but non-zero errors, which yield  0 < g <1 . When  
gZ ,G −gY ,G ≤0 , it follows 
that  PZ −PY < 0 , and thus discriminators are dominated by defectors. When  
gZ ,G −gY ,G > 0 , this 
can result in, if any, a boundary equilibrium R with  z = zR , such that it satisfies 
 
zR =
c
(gZ ,G −gY ,G )b
≥
c
b
.           (S2) 
equation (S2) implies that for all cases of the 16 second-order social norms, the threshold 
frequency for discriminators to successfully invade a population of defectors is at least the cost-
to-benefit ratio  c b . 
Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, and Shunning 
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We compare the effectiveness of Staying with the results of the most prevailing social 
norms. We specifically check the global dynamics of Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, 
and Shunning. First, we note that by definition the conditional probability that a donor is 
assessed as good when a potential recipient is good (that is, the first term in the sum in equation 
(3)) is the same as it is in equation (4) of Staying. The difference is in the second term in the 
sum.  
For Scoring, we obtain  
 
gX = εg +ε(1−g) = ε,
gY = e2g + e2(1−g) = e2 ,
gZ = εg + e2(1−g).
          (S3) 
Since Scoring is a first-order social norm that depends only on what a donor did, the degrees of 
goodness in cooperators and defectors,  gX  and  gY , are independent of the recipient’s degree of 
goodness g. A discriminator is assessed as good for a good recipient, with probability  ε , or for a 
bad recipient, with the probability that he intentionally defects yet with assessment error  e2 . 
Next, for Simple-standing, 
 
gX = εg + (1−e2 )(1−g),
gY = e2g + (1−e2 )(1−g),
gZ = εg + (1−e2 )(1−g).
          (S4) 
Simple-standing is the most tolerant norm, which is to assign a good image to a donor, 
irrespective of his/her actions to a bad recipient. Thus, the second term in the sum is the same as 
 (1−e2 )(1−g)  over  gX ,  gY , and  gZ , in which case the donor is assessed as good only when no 
assessment error occurs. 
Then, for Stern-judging, 
 
gX = εg + (1−ε)(1−g),
gY = e2g + (1−e2 )(1−g),
gZ = εg + (1−e2 )(1−g).
          (S5) 
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Stern-judging assigns a good image to those who refuse to help a bad recipient and a bad image 
to those who help a bad recipient. This leads to the second term in the sum for  gX . When a 
recipient is bad, unintentionally refusing help with no assessment error or intentionally giving 
help with assessment errors are both assessed as good. This conditional probability is 
 (1−e1)e2 + e1(1−e2 ) =1−ε . 
Finally, for Shunning, 
 
gX = εg + e2(1−g),
gY = e2g + e2(1−g),
gZ = εg + e2(1−g).
          (S6) 
Shunning is the strictest case, in which a bad image is assigned to a donor irrespective of his/her 
actions toward a bad recipient. Thus, the second term in the sum is the same as  e2(1−g)  over 
 gX ,  gY , and  gZ , in which case the donor is assessed as good only when assessment errors occur. 
Substituting equations (S3), (S4), (S5), or (S6) into equation (6), we obtain 
 PZ −PY = (1−e1)[(ε−e2 )bz−c]g.          (S7) 
Considering  g > 0 , this results in a unique boundary equilibrium R with  z = zR , such that it is a 
repelling point and satisfies 
 
zR =
c
(ε−e2 )b
=
c
(1−e1)(1−2e2 )b
.          (S8) 
This leads to that when  (ε−e2 )b> c , the unique equilibrium enters edge ZY (  x = 0 ). 
Comparing equations (8) and (S8), it is obvious that the basin of attraction for node Z ( z =1) is 
wider under Staying than under the other four cases. Indeed, as the degrees of error,  e1  and  e2 , 
move toward 0, the fraction necessary for discriminators to emerge,  zR  in equations (8) and (S8), 
converges to 0 and  c b , respectively. Thus, under Scoring, Simple-standing, Stern-judging, or 
Shunning, a sufficiently small cost-to-benefit ratio  c b  is required for rare mutants of 
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discriminators to successfully invade a population of defectors. In striking contrast to this, under 
Staying, rare mutants of discriminators can invade as long as assessment errors e2 are very small.  
Next, we turn to the payoff difference between cooperators and discriminators in 
equation (9). For Scoring, substituting equation (S3) yields 
 
PZ −PX = (1−e1)[(e2−ε)bz + c](1−g)
            =−(PZ −PY )
1−g
g
.        
(S9) 
Hence, there is a line consisting of fixed points with the same z-coordinate given by equation 
(S8). This line connects boundary fixed points Q on edge ZX ( y = 0 ) and R on edge ZY 
( x = 0 ). We note that in contrast to R, Q is attracting along edge ZX. In particular, node Z is a 
saddle point, and node Y is a unique equilibrium that is asymptotically stable (see Fig. 2b). More 
details of these global dynamics can be explored by applying analogous arguments from refs. 5 
and 39. 
For Simple-standing or Shunning, substituting equation (S4) or (S6) yields the same 
results as in equation (10):  PZ −PX = (1−e1)c(1−g)≥0.  For Stern-judging, substituting 
equation (S5) yields  PZ −PX = (1−e1)[(ε−e2 )bz + c](1−g)≥0.  Thus, for the typical parameter 
settings, similarly to Staying, cooperators are dominated by discriminators and defectors, leading 
the population to converge to edge YZ ( x = 0 ). Thus, the global dynamics are qualitatively the 
same as those for Staying. However, the four social norms and the Staying norm differ 
quantitatively in the position of the repeller R,  zR  (see Fig. 2c-e). 
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Assessment:  
What does the donor image look like? 
Action:  
What should donor do? 
C
on
di
tio
ns
 
Recipient’s 
image 
G G G G B B B B G G B B 
Donor’s 
image 
G B G B G B G B G B G B 
Donor’s 
action 
C C D D C C D D –  – – – 
Scoring G G B B G G B B C C D D 
Shunning 
Same as in Scoring 
B B B B C C D D 
Le
ad
in
g 
ei
gh
t 
L1 (Standing) G G G B C C D C 
L2 B G G B C C D C 
L3 (Simple-
standing) 
G G G G C C D D 
L4 G B G G C C D D 
L5 B G G G C C D D 
L6 (Stern-
judging) 
B B G G C C D D 
L7 (Strict-
standing) 
G B G B C C D D 
L8 B B G B C C D D 
Staying P P P P C C D D 
Table S1. Social norms: Staying, Scoring, Shunning, and the leading eight. “G” and “B” 
describe good image and bad image, respectively. “C” and “D” denote an action to help and to 
refuse to help, respectively. “P” means that the donor’s image remains unchanged. With 
Scoring19,20,39-41, whether to help or not determines the donor’s image. When a potential recipient 
has a good image, the leading eight strategies23,24 all have the same assessment as Scoring. 
Coding of the leading eight, L1 to L8, is the same as assigned in ref. 43. L1 is the original 
“Standing”1,21,22, which is viewed as a third-order social norm. Only rules L1 and L2 have 
different action rules, which prescribe cooperation when both donor and recipient have bad 
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images. L1 (Standing) and L3 (Simple-standing) differ in that part of the action rule and also in 
the assessment of donors who refuse to help a bad recipient. Shunning5,42 and Scoring do not 
belong to the leading eight, as Shunning could not achieve a sufficiently high degree of 
cooperation at the equilibrium state38.  
